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Introduction 
On 22 February 2002, after more than 25 years of armed conflict, the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri Lankan 
government signed a ceasefire agreement (CFA). The two sides began 
talks, and there were genuine hopes that the peace process might 
resolve the long-standing separatist conflict through peaceful 
negotiations. However, peace talks soon stalled over fundamental 
political disagreements, and by late 2005 the peace process had 
effectively broken down. After the election of President Mahinda 
Rajapaksa in 2006, the government began a full-scale 
counterinsurgency campaign, and on 3 January 2008 the government 
unilaterally abrogated the CFA, formally ending the peace process. In 
May 2009, government forces finally defeated the LTTE in a violent 
military assault on LTTE positions, accompanied by mass killings of 
civilians and allegations of war crimes. The result was an ‘authoritarian 
peace’, in which mass armed violence was ended and the political 
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situation stabilised, but the authorities largely failed to address 
continuing grievances among minority Tamils. 
The Sri Lankan peace process has become a key case study in a growing 
debate about the nature of post-liberal peace, particularly the apparent 
shift in approaches to peacebuilding from liberal to illiberal forms of 
conflict management (Goodhand 2010; Goodhand et al. 2010; Lewis 
2010; Lewis et al. 2018; Sørbø et al. 2011; Piccolino 2015). The basic 
tenets of the Sri Lankan peace process – third-party mediation by 
Norway, a strong role for civil society and track II negotiations, a 
commitment to conflict resolution through peaceful negotiation in 
neutral venues with parity among parties to the peace talks – were 
classic components of a liberal peace process. The reasons behind the 
collapse of the peace process into renewed war, the nature of the 
subsequent counterinsurgency, and the sustainability of the post-
conflict political order are all highly contested. While there is broad 
agreement that domestic politics, particularly the rise in influence of 
Sinhalese nationalist sentiments, played a primary role in the demise of 
the peace process (Goodhand 2010), the reasons why they were able 
to gain popular support and the extent to which international factors 
played a role are all disputed. 
One area of critique has focused primarily on the role of the 
international community. Perhaps the most radical critique of the 
peace process argues that the location of the peace process within a 
broadly Westphalian philosophy of international relations ensured that 
it would always be hostile to the legitimate aspirations of Tamils for 
self-determination (Fernando 2014; Rampton and Nadarajah 2017). In 
this view, the underlying tenet of international negotiations – that Sri 
Lanka’s territorial integrity was essentially non-negotiable – made a 
relapse into war inevitable. A very different view, but also focused on 
the international system, points to a geopolitical shift of power away 
from Western, liberal powers towards China and other ‘rising powers’ 
that made it easier for the Sri Lankan government to resort to war and 




to defend its position in the UN and other bodies (Lewis 2010). A third 
area of discussion focused on the international examines the role of 
external meditation in peace processes and has led to some soul-
searching among peace negotiators, particularly for the key negotiator, 
Norway, about their future engagement in complex peace processes 
(Sørbø et al. 2011). 
A second area of critique focuses on the design and implementation of 
the peace process in the national context (Sørbø et al. 2011). One area 
of discussion addresses inclusivity. The Sri Lankan peace process was 
exclusive and narrowly defined, imposing a bipolar framework on a 
myriad of complex conflicts and tensions in the post-colonial state. 
Parties excluded from the talks – particularly Sinhala nationalist forces 
– used criticism of the peace process to mobilise and gain popular 
support (ICG 2006). Another area of debate involves attention to 
human rights abuses and questions of internal politics on both sides. 
Negotiators and parties to the process overlooked human rights abuses 
by both parties, but there was particular reluctance to confront the 
LTTE, for fear of upsetting the peace process (Keenan 2007). This 
debate also has more and less radical positions. For some, with 
hindsight, there were problems in implementation, sequencing, and 
design that might have been addressed differently, but the overall 
effort was still worthwhile. A more critical position, however, argues 
that the poor design and implementation of the process contributed to 
the subsequent turn to full-scale military counterinsurgency (Lewis 
2010). 
Conflict analysis 
The analysis of the conflict is highly contested, both among scholars 
and within the different traditions largely represented by Sinhala and 
Tamil political movements. A simple bipolar description of the conflict 
is based on an historic ethnic divide on the island between the majority 
Sinhala community, who are traditionally Buddhist in faith and inhabit 
largely the central and southern regions of the country, and an ethnic 




Tamil community, predominantly settled in the north and east, who 
primarily practice Hinduism; both groups have sizeable Christian 
minorities. Even the demographics are disputed. The last full census 
was conducted in 1981, and internal and external displacement of 
populations has caused significant shifts in population. In 1981, Sri 
Lankan Tamils constituted about 12.7 per cent of the population, with 
a majority living in the north and east of the island. The Sinhalese made 
up 74 per cent, while ‘Upcountry’ Tamils – communities brought into 
Sri Lanka as indentured labour by the British in the late nineteenth 
century – formed 5.5 per cent and Tamil-speaking Muslims formed 
some 7.3 per cent (ICG 2006). 
At its most simplistic, the four ‘Eelam Wars’ between 1983 and 2009 
that together are considered to constitute the Sri Lankan civil war were 
a struggle over territory between an armed separatist movement, the 
LTTE, which aimed to establish an independent Tamil homeland, and 
successive Sri Lankan governments, dominated by Sinhalese political 
leaders, who sought to maintain the country as a unitary state. Ethnicity 
had already become a salient political divide following the introduction 
of universal suffrage in 1931 (Spencer 2008). Following independence 
from Britain in 1948, ethnicity became the most salient cleavage at 
elections, with Sinhalese political parties engaged in ‘ethnic outbidding’ 
against each other, each advocating nationalist policies, including the 
disenfranchisement of upcountry Tamils in 1949, the Sinhala-only 
language law of 1956, and increasing constraints on employment of 
Tamils in the new state apparatus and restrictions on their entry to 
university (DeVotta 2004). This increasing marginalisation of Tamils 
provided the impetus for a powerful nationalist movement, which 
eventually developed into armed militancy against the Sri Lankan state. 
However, this binary view of ethnic and political divisions is a highly 
simplistic framework through which to understand Sri Lanka’s 
multiple conflicts. Both the civil war of 1983–2009 and the peace 
process of 2002–2006 can also be understood as representing the 




suppression of a whole set of other conflicts within each ethnic 
community by the reification of one bipolar conflict regarding the 
territorial division of the state. As Uyangoda (2011) has argued, the 
civil war is best understood as a crisis of state-building, or even of two-
state-building projects, that of the Sinhalese polity in the south and a 
parallel process among Tamils in the north. The crisis of the legitimacy 
and identity of the post-colonial state emerged in a wide range of 
conflicts informed by multiple cleavages, not only that of ethnicity. In 
the 1960s and 1970s, class and revolutionary movements, inspired by 
issues of distributive justice, were nevertheless intertwined with issues 
of ethnicity and failed to overcome the ethnic divide (Spencer 2008). 
A mass rebellion by the Sinhalese Maoist movement, the Janatha 
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), in 1971 was brutally suppressed by the 
military, representing a significant shift towards the normalisation of 
violence and militarisation of Sri Lankan society. 
The JVP uprising demonstrated the deep divisions with Sinhalese 
society. Political divisions ran deep, particularly between the leftist Sri 
Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP), which represented rural voters in the 
south and claimed to be more representative of authentic Sinhalese 
communities, and its main political rival, the United National Party 
(UNP), the party of the urban English-speaking Colombo elite and of 
business. Although it was the UNP that launched the 2001 peace 
process and an SLFP administration that presided over the 2006–2009 
war, previous UNP administrations had also been deeply implicated in 
episodes of anti-Tamil violence. The ability of both parties to appeal 
to nationalist constituencies ensured that support for extreme 
nationalist parties, such as the JVP – and a later party, shaped by 
militant Buddhism, the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) – was always 
relatively limited; such parties were capable of mobilising vocal 
opposition to conciliatory policies and setting the political agenda, 
particularly during elections. The JVP and the JHU became the most 
powerful opponents of the peace process and played significant roles 
in its collapse (DeVotta and Stone 2008; ICG 2007b). Moreover, the 




project of a unitary Sinhala-Buddhist state promoted by the JHU 
became part of the political mainstream, particularly under the SLFP 
government of President Rajapaksa. 
The rise of the JVP in the south illustrated the extent to which the 
conflicts in Sri Lanka were intertwined crises of ethnic politics, post-
colonial identities, and socio-economic questions. During the 1960s 
and 1970s, the SLFP led a socialist economic policy, which restricted 
private sector business and vastly expanded the state bureaucracy. This 
both closed off the private sector as an area for ethnic Tamils to fulfil 
aspirations and led to a rapid Sinhalisation of the state, as patronage 
networks and ethnicity-based recruitment became widespread. 
However, more pro-market policies under the UNP after 1977 did 
little to undermine ethnic cleavages: indeed, some argue that the 
pursuit of market reforms also increased the Sinhalisation of the state. 
Moreover, many Tamils viewed state development programmes, such 
as the huge Mahaweli dam programme, as vehicles for more Sinhalese 
settlement in traditional Tamil homelands. Certainly, such projects 
increased the competition over land and water that lay behind many 
local ethnic tensions (Bandarage 2008). 
In the north, Tamil activists claimed that the possibility of campaigning 
for change by peaceful means had been largely exhausted by the early 
1970s, after successive government crackdowns. The new Constitution 
of 1972 consolidated the ‘Sinhala-only’ language policy and imposed a 
duty on the state to protect and foster Buddhism (Coomaraswamy 
2013: 126–129). It contributed to a new radicalism, evident in the 
adoption by Tamil leaders of the 1976 Vaddukoddai resolution, which 
advocated an independent Tamil state. The commitment to a separate 
state (Tamil Eelam) remained the primary aim of the LTTE 
throughout the war and the peace process, although discussions were 
beginning about potential confederal or federal solutions to the 
conflict. The LTTE refused to permit debate with Tamil political 
leaders calling for different models of devolution. In 1999, the LTTE 




assassinated the moderate Tamil leader Neelan Tiruchelvam, who had 
authored a more moderate proposal for Tamil autonomy within the Sri 
Lankan state. 
Some of the underlying grievances of Tamils over language and 
university admissions were addressed in a series of concessions won 
by Tamil parliamentary parties in 1977–1978. The changes were too 
late and too limited to calm growing militancy among Tamil youth, 
particularly in the Jaffna peninsula, which had already entered a cycle 
of violence between state and rebel forces. The LTTE, led by the 
charismatic Velupillai Prabhakaran, was just one of many militant 
groups active on the Jaffna peninsula in the 1970s. They first came to 
prominence through the assassination of Alfred Duraiappah, the 
mayor of Jaffna, in 1975, and soon gained a reputation as the best 
organised and most ruthless of the new militants. Rebel attacks sparked 
government counter-actions and mass pogroms and riots, including 
the deliberate burning of Jaffna library in 1981. After LTTE militants 
killed 13 Sri Lankan policemen in Jaffna in July 1983, there were mass 
communal pogroms in Colombo and other southern districts against 
ethnic Tamils. Estimates of those killed in the riots varied from 400 to 
3,000. Many Tamils fled the country after the ‘Black July’ events, 
creating a highly politicised diaspora in the UK, Canada, and other 
Western countries, which also proved to be a significant source of 
funding for militant activities in Sri Lanka. 
After 1983, sporadic militant attacks developed into a full-scale 
guerrilla war, punctuated by attacks on civilians, such as the 1984 Kent 
and Dollar Farm massacre, when militants hacked to death hundreds 
of civilians at night, and the 1985 killing of over 100 civilians at the 
Jaya Sri Maha Bodhi shrine at Anuradhapura. The massacres prompted 
brutal government responses, in what became a self-sustaining cycle of 
violence and revenge. Militants effectively took control of large parts 
of the Jaffna peninsula, the heart of Tamil life in the north of the 
country. A major military offensive by the government in 1987 might 




have succeeded in retaking control of Jaffna from militant groups but 
for the intervention of the Indian government, which put pressure on 
the Sri Lankan government to halt military activities. India, which had 
covertly armed and trained many Tamil militant groups, pressured the 
government into signing the Indo–Sri Lanka Peace Accord of 29 July 
1987, which provided important concessions to the Tamils, including 
territorial autonomy in the north-east of the island, through the 13th 
amendment to the Constitution. Militant groups were to disarm and 
an Indian peacekeeping force (IPKF) was introduced into conflict-
affected areas. However, the Indian intervention quickly turned into a 
disaster, after the LTTE refused to disarm and became involved in a 
conflict with Indian troops; the government, meanwhile, faced another 
JVP-led uprising in the south. 
The consequences of the IPKF’s intervention in Sri Lanka were far-
reaching. In 1991, an LTTE suicide bomber assassinated former Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi, in Tamil Nadu. Thereafter, although India 
never intervened militarily, the sympathy of official India and 
particularly of the Gandhi dynasty for the Tamil political struggle and 
for the LTTE dissipated considerably. More significantly, in the short 
term, the rapid withdrawal of the IPKF allowed the LTTE to seize 
control of large swaths of territory in the north and east and to begin 
to establish a de facto state (Stokke 2006). From 1990 to 2001, 
government forces faced the LTTE in two long periods of military 
confrontation, sometimes termed ‘Eelam War II’ and ‘Eelam War III’. 
The wars were marked by enormous brutality, frequent massacres, and 
ethnic cleansing. The LTTE dominated Tamil politics and asserted its 
claim to be the sole representative of Sri Lankan Tamils through a 
campaign of violence and killing of other Tamil political figures (Hoole 
et al 2018). The LTTE attacked not only Sinhalese civilians 
(assassinations included Sri Lankan President Premadasa in 1993) but 
also Muslims, who also traditionally inhabited the east and north of the 
island. In 1990, in an act of ethnic cleansing, the LTTE forced over 
70,000 Muslims to leave Jaffna. The Muslim community had little 




political consciousness until the 1980s, when the Sri Lankan Muslim 
Congress (SLMC) was formed to advocate for better representation of 
Muslim interest, and as a defence against the LTTE (Vellaithamby 
2006). Relations between Muslims and the LTTE were fatally damaged 
by the ethnic cleansing in Jaffna and several massacres, particularly in 
Eastern Province (ICG 2007a; McGilvray 2011). The failure to 
represent Muslim interests in the peace process became a growing 
source of tension in the negotiations after 2003. 
There were hopes of a breakthrough in the conflict following the 
election of SLFP leader Chandrika Kumaratunga in 1994. Initial talks 
with the LTTE broke down in 1995 amid mutual recriminations, and 
were followed by a new government military offensive, dubbed the 
‘War for Peace’. The Sri Lankan military’s campaign had early successes 
but soon ground to a halt against the LTTE’s effective guerrilla 
campaign. The LTTE launched a new campaign of terrorist bombings, 
including numerous suicide bombings, killing hundreds of civilians in 
attacks on the Central Bank in Colombo in 1996, the World Trade 
Centre in 1997, and the Temple of the Holy Tooth in Kandy in 1998. 
The LTTE also held the advantage in conventional warfare, despite the 
makeshift nature of its armed forces. The extreme nature of the 
violence gave the conflict a momentum of its own, with each violent 
attack by the rebels prompting counter-attacks by government forces. 
By the late 1990s, the military advantage began to swing towards the 
LTTE. The LTTE enjoyed several spectacular military successes, 
winning the battle of Elephant Pass in 2000 against superior 
conventional forces, and culminating in a daring raid on Katanayake 
international airport near Colombo in 2001, which destroyed almost 
half of the country’s aircraft. Despite the failure of the ‘War for Peace’ 
policy, President Kumaratunga was narrowly re-elected in 1999, 
perhaps boosted by popular sympathy after she was wounded in an 
LTTE assassination attempt earlier that year. But the SLFP lost 
parliamentary elections in December 2001, with UNP leader Ranil 




Wickremasinghe becoming prime minister in 2001 after running a pro-
peace campaign. 
By 2001, the conflict appeared to many observers have reached a 
moment of ‘ripeness’ for resolution. On the government side, there 
was a widespread view that the war was militarily unwinnable and that 
a political solution was required. The attack on Colombo airport badly 
damaged the tourist industry, and the economy went into recession. 
Although the war had developed a political economy of its own, the 
damage caused by LTTE attacks to the economy outweighed any 
influence of the war economy (Sørbø et al. 2011: 24). For the LTTE, 
the peace process offered a possibility of turning military success into 
political recognition, including international legitimacy. Having lost 
India’s support, the LTTE faced a hostile international environment, 
compounded by the US announcement that it was launching a War on 
Terror in the aftermath of the terrorist attack by Al-Qaeda on New 
York in September 2001. The LTTE undoubtedly believed that they 
had an opportunity to consolidate their existing territorial gains and 
achieve a new political status quo. In retrospect, it is clear that neither 
side was as ready for genuine negotiations as some external actors 
believed. Whatever their many political differences, Sinhalese 
politicians of all parties were still united in their opposition to Tamil 
secession. The LTTE, meanwhile, remained committed to an 
independent Tamil state. 
The conflict resolution process 
Using an external mediator was widely seen as an important first step 
in bridging this divide. In 1999 the Kumaratunga government had 
secretly asked Norway to engage in talks with the LTTE. Norwegian 
diplomats began a process of shuttling between LTTE representatives 
in exile and political leaders in Colombo, attempting to broker a 
ceasefire (Sørbø et al. 2011). However, it was only with the election of 
Prime Minister Wickremasinghe in 2001 that there was a real shift in 
policy. The LTTE surprised everybody with a unilateral ceasefire in 




December 2001, and a Ceasefire Agreement was concluded by the two 
sides in February 2002. The CFA was a major breakthrough after 
decades of war. The two sides agreed ‘the total cessation of all military 
action’, to be monitored by a Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), 
staffed by around 70 personnel from Nordic states (CFA 2002). It had 
offices across the north and east of the country and was permitted to 
travel freely to report on any CFA violations. In this aspect, the CFA 
was relatively successful, with direct attacks by the LTTE and 
government forces largely ceasing until late 2005. The CFA also agreed 
the opening of long-closed transport corridors, including the main 
Jaffna–Kandy road, and allowed both civilians and unarmed 
combatants to move freely across lines once more. The CFA had 
several immediate positive impacts, not least an end to the everyday 
violence and military activity on fronts in the north and east of the 
country, and increased freedom of trade across the country. The 
government set up a Secretariat for Coordination of the Peace Process, 
SCOPP, to support the process from the government side. 
The most controversial aspects of the CFA were the benefits it granted 
to the LTTE. The agreement recognised existing frontlines, effectively 
entrenching the LTTE as the sole governing body in areas under its 
control. Although the CFA ordered parties to ‘abstain from hostile acts 
against the civilian population, including such acts as torture, 
intimidation, abduction, extortion and harassment’, the LTTE 
continued its long-standing practice of recruiting child soldiers, 
extorting Tamil and Muslim businesses, and mounting political 
assassinations of its rivals. The vast majority of recorded violations of 
the CFA were by the LTTE. Of 1,996 complaints to the SLMM in 
2003, 670 concerned the recruitment of children by the LTTE as 
soldiers (Höglund 2005: 161). Operating in conditions of constant 
warfare, the LTTE had developed a highly authoritarian regime, which 
controlled all media production, permitted no dissent, and punished 
any political deviation severely. Using the protection of the CFA, the 
LTTE further solidified its claim to de facto statehood, developing a 




police force, a judiciary, and other rudimentary government structures, 
but rejecting any calls for more pluralist politics (Stokke 2006). The Sri 
Lankan government continued to fund state agencies based in what it 
termed ‘uncleared areas’, territories outside government control, but in 
practice these state bodies and officials were under the control of the 
LTTE. In Eastern Province, where the government and LTTE shared 
control in a complex patchwork of jurisdiction, LTTE political and 
intelligence officers were permitted to travel in government-controlled 
areas. In practice, this often meant a further extension of LTTE 
indirect control over Tamil businesses and communities in those areas. 
According to human rights activists: 
The LTTE moved into towns to freeload from Muslim shops and to 
extort from Tamils and Muslim civilians alike. In areas along the main 
road from Valaichenai to Kallar where the LTTE’s movements were 
hitherto inhibited, the LTTE came in and started demanding children 
and money to set up offices. Where the children were extremely young, 
the LTTE often demanded a written declaration from the parents that 
they would give the first child that [came] of age – reportedly 12 years. 
(UTHR 2002) 
LTTE violations of the CFA posed a major challenge for the 
negotiators. For the most part, the SLMM and international 
negotiators preferred to downplay evidence of violations, for fear of 
upsetting the delicate peace negotiations. In effect, the LTTE was 
permitted to further its vertical control over the north and east in 
exchange for its agreement to horizontal negotiation with the 
government. The LTTE, as with all parties to the agreement, wished 
to transform a complex, multi-layered conflict with multiple 
participants into a simple, binary peace process with two main actors 
who could represent their respective communities. The LTTE viewed 
itself as the sole representative of Tamil-speaking people in Sri Lanka, 
but this position was rejected by many dissident Tamil groups and by 




Muslim communities, who asserted their own separate identity, despite 
their use of the Tamil language. 
Peace talks 
There were various contacts between different parties during 2002, but 
formal peace talks began on 16 September 2002 in Sattahip in Thailand 
between a government delegation headed by G.L. Peiris, a lawyer, and 
Anton Balasingham, a London-based negotiator, who had long-
standing, close connections with LTTE leader, Prabhakaran. Although 
the talks were reported to be cordial, the focus was on CFA 
implementation and humanitarian issues rather than any substantive 
political questions. During a further round (31 October–3 November 
2002) of talks, also held in Thailand, the two sides agreed to establish 
three sub-committees: a Sub-committee on Political Affairs (SPA), a 
Sub-committee on De-escalation and Normalization (SDN), and a 
Sub-committee on Immediate Humanitarian Rehabilitation Needs 
(SIHRN). Despite the establishment of the SPA, it never met, and 
political issues were often side-lined in favour of humanitarian and 
development issues (ICG 2006). 
Talks in Oslo in December 2002 were initially seen as a breakthrough, 
when both sides agreed to 
explore a solution founded on the principle of internal self-
determination in areas of historical habitation of the Tamil speaking 
peoples, based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka 
(Waldman 2002). 
The assertion that the LTTE had agreed to work within a federal Sri 
Lanka was seen as a positive step forward by the mediators, but it 
apparently caused severe strains among LTTE negotiators (Sørbø et al. 
2011: 42). Balasingham (2004: 464) complained that the statement had 
been ‘blown up as a paradigm shift’, when in reality it merely expanded 
on an existing LTTE position, outlined by Prabhakaran during a 
speech on Martyrs’ Day in November 2002. The Oslo Communiqué 




exposed the difficulties faced by the LTTE in maintaining an 
unwavering commitment to an independent state, in the light of almost 
universal international opposition. After Oslo, Balasingham and other 
LTTE moderates appear to have been side-lined, and LTTE suspicion 
of the peace process intensified. Certainly, any short-lived optimism 
engendered by progress in Oslo began to fade during talks held in 
Nakorn Pathom, Thailand (6–9 January 2003), where the two sides 
struggled to agree on the working of the sub-committees and clashed 
over the issue of so-called High Security Zones (HSZ), areas in which 
many Tamils had been forced out of their homes to make way for 
military bases. These humanitarian concerns were particularly acute in 
Jaffna, but efforts to find a way to link dismantling HSZs to 
demobilisation of LTTE offensive weapons led nowhere (Sørbø et al. 
2011: 41). 
The fifth round of talks, held in Berlin (7–8 February 2003), continued 
the contentious discussion on the HSZs and appeared to reach an 
agreement between the LTTE and UNICEF to resolve the problem of 
child soldiers, although its implementation was deeply flawed (ICG 
2006). Although the LTTE did release some child soldiers, it also 
continued to recruit underage soldiers. A series of violations of the 
CFA during February/March 2003 by the LTTE also began to fuel 
criticism of the government and of the Norwegian mediators. SLMM 
monitors intercepted LTTE arms shipments, and there was concern 
over the activities of the LTTE’s small navy, the ‘Sea Tigers’. 
Meanwhile, Muslim anger at increased LTTE violence in Eastern 
Province sparked a new political activism and sense of identity among 
Muslims (ICG 2007a: 10). In January 2003, as many as 20,000 Muslims 
gathered to acclaim the ‘Oluvil declaration’, which laid out Muslims’ 
claim for rights and status. The exclusion of the Muslim community 
from the peace talks continued to rankle and caused continual 
problems for the Norwegian negotiators over the next two years 
(Mohideen 2006). 




A sixth round of talks was held in Hakone, Japan (18–21 March). At 
this meeting, in response to mounting concerns over the human rights 
abuses obscured by the CFA, Ian Martin, the former head of Amnesty 
International, encouraged both sides to adopt a human rights agenda. 
Both sides – and international mediators – had reasons to resist such 
an imposition, and the idea was never implemented. After Hakone, in 
April 2003, the LTTE pulled out of further talks. The ostensible reason 
was the LTTE’s exclusion from a donors’ conference, to be held in 
Washington DC. (The LTTE was not invited because it was proscribed 
as a terrorist group in the US.) However, as Balasingham admitted, the 
real problem for the LTTE was its fear of being caught in a so-called 
peace trap, whereby an institutionalised, internationalised peace 
process gradually reduced the LTTE’s space for manoeuvre 
(Goodhand and Walton 2009: 309). The nature of the LTTE, a 
mobilisational, authoritarian movement, made it particularly vulnerable 
to a relaxation of military and political pressures. It was more difficult 
to justify the LTTE’s forced recruitment of child soldiers, its 
maximalist political demands, and its repressions against dissidents in 
an environment of relative peace. On 21 April, the LTTE unilaterally 
suspended negotiations with the government, although it reiterated its 
commitment to the CFA. The LTTE was invited to a donors’ 
conference in Tokyo in June 2003, where donors pledged some $4.5 
billion in aid, but the LTTE boycotted the conference. 
The Tokyo conference appointed the US, Japan, and the EU as three 
co-chairs of the peace process, alongside Norway’s established 
mediation role. However, the increasing internationalisation of the 
peace process coincided with a decline in the influence of international 
actors. From late 2003, the fate of the peace process was effectively 
determined by increasingly divisive domestic political factors. On 31 
October 2003, the LTTE presented a proposal for an Interim Self-
Governing Administration (ISGA). The ISGA proposal guaranteed 
LTTE control over the whole of the north-east of the island, which 
would be vacated by the Sri Lankan military, and granted them 




effective autonomy over all domestic governance within the ISGA 
region. The ISGA sharpened a growing divide between the stance of 
the mediators and non-LTTE political elites inside Sri Lanka. While 
Norway viewed the ISGA as a starting point for negotiations and 
welcomed the fact that the LTTE had put forward a formal proposal 
for a structure short of immediate independence, government critics 
viewed the ISGA as little more than a proto-state, which would 
guarantee LTTE de facto statehood in the north-east and offer a viable 
road map to secession via a proposed referendum after five years. 
The ISGA proposal was never viable in the context of a negotiated 
settlement, but it served to crystallise existing divisions in the 
government. President Kumaratunga had long been unhappy with the 
conduct of the peace process and had been effectively side-lined. But 
in the wake of the ISGA proposal, she intervened against Prime 
Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe and declared a state of emergency. The 
move reflected increasing popular disapproval of the UNP 
government and its international allies, largely fuelled by its refusal to 
condemn LTTE ceasefire violations or to dismiss the ISGA proposal 
(Sørbø et al. 2011: 48). These machinations at the top took place in the 
context of a broader shift in nationalist politics, with growing public 
support for the JVP and for militant Buddhist organisations, such as 
the Sinhala Urumaya (Sinhala Heritage) movement, which set up the 
Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) as a political party in 2004. The JHU 
unexpectedly won nine seats at parliamentary elections in April 2004 
and attracted support from many influential middle-class Sinhalese, 
including government officials. Both the JVP and the JHU opposed 
the peace process, instead advocating a full-scale military campaign to 
defeat the LTTE, a position that was marginal in mainstream political 
thought at the time. The SLFP – running as the United People’s 
Freedom Alliance coalition – won a convincing victory at April 2004 
elections, and Mahinda Rajapaksa was appointed prime minister. In 
retrospect, it was probably impossible to have rescued the peace 
process after the April 2004 elections: both the new prime minister and 




President Kumaratunga were opposed to fundamental aspects of the 
peace process, albeit for different reasons. 
The other critical turning point in 2004 emerged from growing 
dissension within the Tamil community. Despite LTTE efforts to 
stamp out any dissent against its monopoly of power, the peace process 
made it more difficult for Prabhakaran to assert total control over the 
movement. In March 2004, the commander of LTTE forces in Eastern 
Province, Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan (more commonly known as 
‘Colonel’ Karuna Amman), announced a breakaway from the LTTE 
leadership of Prabhakaran. This was a huge blow to the LTTE, from 
which it never completely recovered. Karuna led some of the most 
effective military units in the LTTE, and his defection gave the 
government access to invaluable intelligence on the LTTE’s armed 
forces and operations. Although the LTTE defeated Karuna’s forces 
and recovered most territory in the east in the aftermath of the 
defection, some of Karuna’s forces began working with the Sri Lankan 
military as paramilitaries, who knew the terrain well and could 
effectively challenge the LTTE on the ground. Karuna claimed that it 
had been his engagement with the wider world that persuaded him to 
move against what he saw as Prabhakaran’s inflexible position, 
although long-standing disagreements between Eastern and Northern 
Tamil communities probably also played a role (ICG 2006). Whatever 
the real reasons, the split with Karuna was exactly the outcome that 
some LTTE hardliners had feared from the ‘peace trap’; the continued 
existence of the Karuna faction soured further peace talks and became 
a constant source of tension between the two sides. 
The Karuna split probably ended the LTTE’s genuine interest in 
further negotiations, although they reaffirmed their commitment to the 
CFA. A period of phony peace began. In reality, both sides appeared 
to be preparing for war, but conflict was forestalled by the Indian 
Ocean tsunami on 26 December 2004. Amid the devastation (much of 
it on the eastern and north-eastern shores, populated predominantly 




by Tamil and Muslim communities), there was hope that responding 
to the tsunami would bring the two sides together. There was 
cooperation between the different communities in the north and east, 
but this period of relative pluralism was short-lived. For the LTTE, 
this ‘very open and flexible space of opportunity posed a threat and 
needed to be filled as soon as possible’(Walker 2013: 75). With the 
Norwegians mediating once more, both sides supported a Post-
Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS) as a new, joint 
mechanism for distributing aid, which appeared to offer more 
influence for Muslim communities (which were badly affected by the 
tsunami) and a balance between the government and LTTE over how 
aid would be spent. P-TOMS was the last initiative that reflected a 
long-standing belief among negotiators that foreign aid and economic 
development offered a way to bring the two sides together, without 
addressing underlying political issues (Sriskandarajah 2003). However, 
the political implications of the P-TOMS mechanisms were clear and 
immediately fuelled political opposition. Eventually the P-TOMS 
structure was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, but in any 
case it had become irrelevant as the momentum for war resumed in 
the summer of 2005. 
Against this backdrop of renewed controversy, Prime Minister 
Mahinda Rajapaksa, a southern politician from the more nationalist 
wing of the SLFP, won presidential elections in 2005, narrowly 
defeating the UNP’s Ranil Wickremasinghe. With hindsight, the 
election of Rajapaksa was the key event in shifting the Sri Lankan state 
towards a full-scale military campaign, although at the time of the 
election Rajapaksa advocated a more moderate stance and was viewed 
as a pragmatist by international mediators. One important factor in 
Rajapaksa’s victory was the LTTE’s decision to enforce a boycott of 
the election among Tamil voters, rather than supporting their partner 
in the peace process, Ranil Wickremasinghe. The absence of Tamil 
votes in the north provided Rajapaksa with the necessary 2 per cent 
margin for victory. The LTTE decision was perhaps the clearest 




strategic mistake of the entire peace process, based on a false belief 
that a new war with the Sri Lankan state would leave them in a much 
stronger position both domestically and internationally. The decision 
reinforced the view that the LTTE lacked a well-informed political 
strategy. Prabhakaran had a strong reputation as a military tactician but 
lacked good political advice or a well-developed political vision. 
Although Rajapaksa won on a clearly nationalist platform, he initially 
advocated a continuation of the peace process, at least publicly. 
However, in reality the war had already resumed, with killings and 
assassination by both sides, including the murder of Tamil MP Joseph 
Pararajasingham while celebrating Christmas Mass in Batticaloa. 
Although the mediators and the SCOPP remained active, by April 
2006 Defence Minister Gotabaya Rajapaksa was telling negotiators he 
could envisage a military solution to the conflict (Sørbø et al. 2011: 54). 
This conviction was matched by a new military build-up, with Sri 
Lanka on a buying spree for new equipment, including fighter planes 
and new offensive weapons; and a diplomatic offensive, stressing the 
fight against terror and building up relations with sympathetic non-
Western states, such as Pakistan and China (Lewis 2010). A shift in 
international opinion against the LTTE was particularly marked after 
the assassination of Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Lakshman 
Kadirgamar in August 2005, almost certainly by the LTTE. The EU 
proscribed the LTTE in May 2006, and many countries began to 
investigate LTTE activities among Tamil diasporas and block 
fundraising. The JVP and the JHU intensified a campaign of 
demonstrations and protests against Norway and the CFA. 
By June 2006, full-scale military confrontations had resumed, 
particularly in Eastern Province, where fighting was accompanied by 
reports of massacres by government troops or paramilitaries, including 
the killing in August 2006 of 17 aid workers from the French NGO 
Action Contre la Faim. Although peace talks did continue in 28–29 
October 2006 in Geneva between the two sides, in practice the 




government was beginning to believe that it could win a military 
confrontation outright. This was not the view among diplomats. 
Norwegian diplomats agreed that ‘all observers think that this is a 
conflict that cannot be won by military means and most believe that 
the government cannot beat the LTTE militarily’ (Sørbø et al. 2011: 
63). This belief was pervasive in the international and diplomatic 
community, and partly explains the continued willingness of Norway 
and other EU states to maintain the peace process mechanism, with 
the hope that the government would be forced to resume talks once 
its military offensive began to falter. This was a fundamental error in 
analysis but was widely shared. 
In reality, the LTTE turned out to be much weaker militarily than 
expected. Although it managed a symbolic air attack on Colombo in 
April 2007, it proved no match for the better-equipped Sri Lankan 
military. Indeed, the discovery that the LTTE had developed an air 
force prompted India to offer radar and other support to the Sri 
Lankan government (Sørbø et al. 2011: 54). By July 2007, the 
government had driven the LTTE out of Eastern Province. On 2 
January 2008, the government withdrew from the CFA and the SLMM 
was terminated. Government forces launched a military campaign 
against LTTE strongholds in the north and quickly overran LTTE 
positions. International efforts to organise a ceasefire were rejected by 
both sides. The government campaign culminated in the military defeat 
of the LTTE in May 2009, amid accusations of war crimes and mass 
killings of civilians in the final few days of battle (Lewis 2011). 
According to the International Crisis Group, civilian deaths in the final 
few weeks of battle may have exceeded 30,000 (ICG 2010). 
Lessons to be learned from the case study 
There are multiple lessons to be learned from the Sri Lanka peace 
process, and many have been explored in detail elsewhere (ICG 2006; 
Goodhand et al. 2005, 2011; Sørbø et al. 2011; Orjuela 2010). Three 
key issues that have wider application are (1) the over-reliance on 




foreign aid and a development agenda to have positive impacts on the 
conflict; (2) a poor understanding of the fundamental political 
dynamics at stake in the conflict, including – above all – the internal 
politics of the LTTE; and (3) the misreading of a shifting international 
environment, in which Western leverage became increasingly irrelevant 
as the peace process developed. 
Aid and development 
A key point through the process was the ‘inflated assessment of the 
leverage of aid’ (Goodhand and Walton 2009: 310), and the undue 
influence on the peace process of development professionals, aid 
workers, and humanitarian NGOs. Donors believed that foreign aid 
would offer a ‘peace dividend’ that would boost support for the peace 
process and improve cooperation between the two sides (Bastian 2007; 
Sriskandarajah 2003; Goodhand et al. 2005; Goodhand and Walton 
2009). This was a profound misreading of the nature of the conflict. 
An emphasis on humanitarian and development issues during the 
peace process did not act as a process of confidence-building to lay the 
ground for later political discussions. Instead, efforts to create joint 
development initiatives merely reproduced the fundamental divisions 
in the peace process, but in different form. 
Institutions designed to deliver aid, such as the North–East 
Reconstruction Fund (NERF), funded by international donors, or the 
SIHRN and P-TOMS, were often viewed by international negotiators 
as ‘soft’ mechanisms to achieve cooperation and confidence-building. 
In reality, both sides viewed the control of aid and development funds 
as primarily a political question and refused to acknowledge demands 
for recognition of the neutrality of humanitarian space. The LTTE 
viewed the control and channelling of foreign aid as an important way 
for them to achieve greater local legitimacy and to further develop their 
nascent state structures (Sørbø et al. 2011: 107). Engagement with 
international donors was seen as a form of partial international 
recognition (Burke and Mulakala 2011). NGOs were constantly subject 




to LTTE controls or were persuaded to channel their aid through the 
LTTE’s development wing, the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation 
(TRO). The post-tsunami influx of aid organisations into Sri Lanka, far 
from supporting the peace process, often created local conflicts among 
different communities and local leaders (Sørbø et al. 2011: 109), and 
sometimes fuelled nationalist, anti-Western sentiments in the south. 
This manipulation of aid and the failure to achieve humanitarian space 
during the peace process was followed by even more cynical 
politicisation of aid during 2006–2009, when ‘information control and 
the manipulation of aid – granting partial humanitarian access in return 
for silence – [became] a key part of the SL government’s strategy’ (ODI 
2010: 3). 
Politics 
The partial attempt to de-politicise the peace process through a 
development track was compounded by insufficient attention to the 
politics of peace, both the everyday domestic politics that ultimately 
undermined the whole process and the underlying political questions 
that divided the two sides. Although it was unrealistic to expect a peace 
process to address the full range of complex historical cleavages of a 
post-colonial state, the insistence on a bipolar framework made it 
extremely difficult to address the challenges of intra-community 
divisions, among both Tamils and Sinhalese, and also to address the 
inclusion of other communities, such as the Muslims. The non-viability 
of the LTTE’s plans for independence, given universal international 
opposition, should have been part of the guiding framework for the 
talks. Instead, this principle was often fudged through academic 
discussions of federal alternatives, which were unlikely to be accepted 
by the LTTE leadership. Moreover, the highly authoritarian nature of 
LTTE rule, which made many Tamils and Muslims nervous about 
granting substantial autonomy to the LTTE, was hardly addressed. The 
failure to respond adequately to serious human rights abuses by the 
LTTE in the first year of the CFA discredited the process for many 




democratic Tamil voices and provided ammunition to potential 
spoilers among Sri Lankan nationalists (Höglund 2005; ICG 2006; 
Keenan 2007). In neither of the state-building projects – that of the 
LTTE or of the Sinhala state – was there any attempt at political reform 
during this period, yet reform of the state was a precondition for 
sustainable peace (Uyangoda 2010). During 2004–2005, it was 
advocates of extremist state-building projects – the LTTE on the one 
hand and the proponents of the Sinhala-Buddhist hegemonic state on 
the other – that accrued most influence, with liberal and moderate 
voices becoming discredited by their association with the peace 
process. In this sense, the conduct of the peace process made its 
eventual failure much more dangerous than it might otherwise have 
been by fuelling Sinhalese nationalist sentiment, which came to insist 
on a maximalist military solution to the conflict (Lewis 2010). 
Shifting international environment 
The third major lesson of the Sri Lankan peace process regards the role 
of external mediators and the international community in general. 
There have been numerous specific criticisms of the modalities of 
Norway’s involvement in the peace process, prompting a broader 
discussion of the role of external mediators in peace processes (Sørbø 
et al. 2011). Certainly, the assumption that Norway would be viewed 
as an honest broker and perceived as neutral by all sides, was naive. 
Instead, Norwegian negotiators became the focus of nationalist anger, 
protests, and demonstrations. The international community was 
complacent about public opinion, possibly misled by opinion polls 
suggesting strong support for the peace process in 2003–2004. Once 
military conflict resumed in 2006, however, the public swung quickly 
behind the government and backed the military counterinsurgency 
(Lewis 2010). International actors struggled to engage with the public 
more widely, or with a broad spectrum of political forces outside a 
narrow Colombo elite of UNP politicians and civil society actors. 
While external actors had some influence over the policies of the UNP 




government of 2001–2004, they struggled to find ways to influence the 
LTTE. Moreover, EU states rapidly lost influence with the 
government after the election of Rajapaksa in 2005. 
The decline of Western influence was more than matched by President 
Rajapaksa’s new diplomatic ties. He found China ready to offer 
financial support and military hardware and discovered diplomatic 
allies among non-Western powers, including Russia, India, and China. 
Indeed, the Sri Lankan case demonstrated that all peace processes now 
have to operate within a new geopolitical constellation, in which the 
leverage of Western powers is sharply reduced and the  concept of 
small, liberal powers such as Norway acting as ‘neutral brokers’ is 
increasingly difficult to maintain. Instead, major powers such as China 
and Russia play a decisive role, both directly by backing governments 
facing internal conflicts and diplomatically in the UN Security Council. 
These shifts in power are accompanied by changes in norms. The 
liberal norms that have informed peace processes since the late 1980s 
are now contested and challenged at every level. The failure of the Sri 
Lankan peace process marked the beginning of a new era in which 
illiberal and authoritarian responses to internal conflicts have become 
increasingly normalised. 
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